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THE COMMISSION AND THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
Robert Braucher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Contract law has long been a favorite subject for legislative reform
and revision. Early in the nineteenth century, Jeremy Bentham drew
up an elaborate scheme under which judges would submit proposals for
legislation though a Justice Minister;1 second among three classes of
topics in relation to which he thought his scheme afforded "the best
promise of being conducive to the melioration of the body of the law"
were "topics related to the interpretation, authorization, and execution
of contracts, as between individual and individual."2
Mercantile contracts, such as those embodied in negotiable instru-
ments, had been greatly affected by statutes from far earlier times.8 In
the latter part of the nineteenth century there was much effort to revise
and codify such statutes. A pioneer effort was made in England by the
Mercantile Law Commission; its Second Report, made in 1855, consists
primarily of recommendations that contract rules in the different parts
of the United Kingdom be "assimilated." 4 In America the movement for
codification led to the California Codes of 1872, following Field's Code
proposed for New York. The California Codes and the English Bills of
Exchange Act of 1882 and Sale of Goods Act, 1893, provided models for
the codifying efforts of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.5 The Negotiable Instruments Law and the Uniform
Sales Act, promulgated by the Commissioners in 1896 and 1906, respec-
tively, contain a great deal of contract law.
Judge Cardozo's plea for a "ministry of justice," an agency to mediate
between legislature and courts, was made in 1921.1 That plea was a
forceful restatement of Bentham's vision of a century before; and it was
* See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 764, for biographical data. Valuable help in the
preparation of this Article was given by Max L. Gillam, a member of the second-year
class, Harvard Law School.
1 See 9 Bentham, Works 502-514, 597-598, 607 (Bowring ed. 1893).
2 Id. at 507.
3 See Beutel's Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law Part I (7th ed. 1948).
4 Mercantile Law Commission, Second Report (1855); cf. Mercantile Law Amendment
Act, Scotland, 1856, 19 and 20 Vict. c. 60; Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, 19 and
20 Vict. c. 97.
5 See Beutel's Brannan, supra note 3, at 61, 75.
6 See Cardozo, "A Ministry of Justice," 35 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 114 (1921); Note, 20
Cornell L.Q. "119 (1934); MacDonald and Rosenzweig, "The Law Revision Commission of
the State of New York," 20 Cornell L.Q. 415 (1935); Shientag, "A Ministry of Justice in
Action," 22 Cornell L.Q. 183 (1937).
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the germ which led to the creation of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission in 1934.1 Contract rules were prominent among Judge Cardozo's
suggestions for revision of "outworn and unjust" rules. The Commis-
sion's charter does not single out contract law for special treatment, but
it does make express provision for the Commission to receive and consider
recommendations of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that perhaps a quarter of the Com-
mission's work has been work on the law of contracts. Its initial calendar
for "immediate study" listed 17 topics. Two dealt with amendments to
uniform laws; and the two resulting bills, amending the Uniform Sales
Act and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, were among the nine Commis-
sion bills enacted at the 1935 session of the Legislature.8 A third project
on the initial project list dealt with consideration and the seal; it pro-
duced a whole series of Commission bills, the first of which was enacted
in 1936. Interestingly enough, the Lord Chancellor appointed a Law
Revision Committee in England in the same year that the New York
Commission was created, and the doctrine of consideration was placed on
its agenda the same year. Thus two similar studies were begun inde-
pendently at about the same time on opposite sides of the ocean, ap-
parently without reference to each other.
A count of the communications from the Commission to the Legislature
concerning substantive changes in the law discloses a total of 311., rec-
ommending 314 bills; 179 bills have been enacted. Some communica-
tions and bills are hard to classify, but I count 79 communications on
contract law, recommending 72 bills of which 39 passed. The 39 bills
enacted include 17 amending the Personal Property Law; they also
include amendments to the Civil Practice Act, the Debtor and Creditor
Law, the Insurance Law, the Lien Law, and the Real Property Law.
These figures cover the nineteen years 1935-1953; early in 1953 the
Commission laid aside all other work in order to study the Uniform
Commercial Code, and no legislative recommendations were made in 1954
or 1955.1'
7 Laws 1934, c. 597, N.Y. Legisl. Law, Art. 4-A, §§ 70-72.
8 Laws 1935, c. 337, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 113, 119 (USA §§ 32, 38); Laws
1935, c. 455, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 156(1), 239(1) (USA § 76, UBLA § 53);
see Leg. Docs. No. 65(A), (B), Report of Law Rev. Com. 7-17, 19-36 (1935).
0 See Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, Cmd. No. 5449 (1937); Annual
Survey of English Law 139 (1937); Hamson, "The Reform of Consideration," 54 L.Q.
Rev. 233 (1938); The Law Revisioh Committee's Sixth Interim Report, 1 Mod. L. Rev.
97 (1937). Contract matters seem to have been less prominent in the work of the New
Zealand Law Revision Committee, formed in 1937. See 13 N.Z.LJ. 224, 232, 306 (1937).
But see note 46, infra.
10 See Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1954); Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1955). [At printing Report of Law
Rev. Com. (1954, 1955) unbound. No page citations available-Ed.]
1955]
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Examination of the Commission's report for 1953, containing its most
recent legislative recommendations, might suggest that contract law
would be less prominent in the future work of the Commission than in
the past. Only three of 20 recommendations, and only two of the 15
bills enacted, dealt with the law of contracts." Similarly, contractual
topics for study included only two of 16 topics listed under "work in
progress" and six of 40 topics "for future consideration." But the Uni-
form Commercial Code covers a great deal of contract law, and it will
apparently occupy at least three full years of the Commission's time.
II. CONSIDERATION AND THE SEAL
The doctrine of consideration has long been a focus of controversy. 2
Consideration is perhaps the main rubric under which our law has placed
the rules setting limits to the enforcement of informal agreements. Under
the classical common-law doctrines, a promise is not enforceable unless
it is under seal or is part of a bargain.3 If the requirement of seal or
consideration is met, enforcement may still be denied on a host of other
grounds. But the basic philosophy of our law of contracts, so far as
there is one, seems to inhere in consideration and the seal:14 many of
the other invalidating rules are commonly thought of as rules of domestic
relations or of government regulation of business or some other branch
of the law besides contracts; others are special to particular types of
contracts.
The classical doctrines have considerable appeal to the modern mind.'5
Denial of enforcement to informal promises often seems fair enough if
the parties neglected to follow the standard formality. But troublearises
from the decay of the seal as a universal formality.'" In its medieval
hey-day, the sealed instrument probably was impressive in part because
of the rare, almost magic quality of a writing as well as because of the
11 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(0) (1953) (At printing, Report of Law Rev. Com. (1953) un-
bound. No page citations available-Ed.] (Statute of Frauds), proposing amendments to
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 31, vetoed, see Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1954); Leg. Doc. No. 65(P) (1953),
Laws 1953, c. 684, amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1083-c (assumption of mortgage debt);
Leg. Doc. No. 65(R) (1953), Laws 1953, c. 401, amending N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 103-a
(payment of debts owed to decedent).
12 See 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 1-48 (1926); "Symposium on Consideration,"
41 Colum. L. Rev. 178 (1941); Havighurst, "Consideration, Ethics and Administration,"
42 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1942).
13 See Restatement, Contracts §§ 19, 75, 95 (1933); Gardner, "An Inquiry into the
Principles of the Law of Contracts," 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 23, 25 (1932).
14 Cf. Williston, "Freedom of Contract," 6 Cornell L.Q. 365 (1921).
15 See, e.g., Havighurst, op. cit. supra note 12, at 30-31; Stelzenmuller, "Formation of
Government Contracts-Application of Common Law Principles," 40 Cornell L.Q. 238,
239, 247-248 (1955).
16 See Crane, "The Magic of the Private Seal," 15 Colum. L. Rev. 24 (1915).
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affixed wafer and the imprint of the promisor's signet ring. But as the
seal lost its distinctive personal quality and became a mere scrawl or a
printed word, it lost its capacity to warn the promisor and to provide
reliable evidence in case of dispute. As more men became literate, the
personal signature became the natural formality and the seal seemed
more and more anachronistic.
Two proposals naturally resulted: first, that the seal should be denied
legal significance; second, that a signed writing should provide a substi-
tute for consideration. Both proposals were made by one member of the
Mercantile Law Coimission in 1855.17 He pointed out that the Scottish
Parliament had legislated against unsigned sealed instruments as early
as 1540, and that Lord Mansfield had thought the doctrine of considera-
tion should not apply where a promise was in writing, or in commercial
cases among merchants. No such proposals were adopted in England;
in this country several states adopted them in whole or in part, though
often in ambiguous and confusing terms.'8
As stated above, the New York Law Revision Commission and the
English Law Revision Committee both entered this arena in 1934. The
products of their studies have been discussed at length elsewhere; 9 here
only the main outlines will be described. The Commission rendered its
first report in 1936, an elaborate and comprehensive document of nearly
300 pages; it also recommended three statutes which were enacted the
same year.20 But those three statutes were not so much products of the
study as they were attempts to rationalize and clarify policies which the
Commission found in statutes enacted in 1934 and 1935;21 their thrust
was to permit a sealed instrument to be modified by an unsealed instru-
ment and to eliminate the requirement of consideration for unsealed
written releases and modifying agreements. The Legislature inserted a
17 See Additional Note by Mr. Anderson, Mercantile Law Commission, Second Report
27-31 (1855).
18 See 1 Williston, Contracts § 219 (Williston & Thompson ed. '1936); 1 Corbin, Contracts
§ 254 (1950).
19 As to England, see note 9 supra. As to New York, see Shientag, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 189-191; Thompson, "Some Current Economic and Political Impacts in the Law of
Contracts," 26 Cornell L.Q. 4 (1940); Hays, "Formal Contracts and Consideration: A
Legislative Program," 41 Colum. L. Rev. 849 (1941); Lloyd, "Consideration and the Seal
in New York: An Unsatisfactory Legislative Program," 46 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1946); Note,
26 Cornell L.Q. 692 (1941).
20 Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), (D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 65-80, 81-374 (1936).'
21 Laws 1934, c. 142, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33(2), amended by Laws 1936,
c. 281 (modification); Laws 1934, c. 143, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 279, amended by
Laws 1934, c. 898, and Laws 1936, c. 281 (modification); Laws 1936, c. 222, adding N.Y.
Debtor and Creditor Law § 243 (release); Laws 1935, c. 708, amending N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act § 342, further amended by Laws 1936, c. 685 (modification of sealed instrument).
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provision concerning undisclosed principals in passing the sealed-instru-
ment bill, and the Commission tidied up that amendment in 1937;22 it
also obtained the enactment of a bill on executory accords which was
entirely consistent with the 1936 statute on modifications.23 But no
general program with respect to consideration and the seal was recom-
mended until 1941.
Between 1936 and 1941 several developments took place. In 1937 the
English Law Revision Committee made its report on consideration,
making eight recommendations with respect to consideration.24 The most
important of these would have made a promise enforceable without con-
sideration if made in writing, including print or type, even though
unsigned. In the same year the New York Court of Appeals issued the
first of two opinions on sealed instruments executed before the 1935
statutes took effect, expressing the view that a gratuitous promise under
seal should be enforceable and applying that view as the law before
1935; 25 and the 1937 Legislature passed a bill to abolish the doctrine of
consideration which was vetoed by the Governor.2 6 A later decision on
the formal requisites of a seal led to a Commission recommendation in
1940;2 but that recommendation was withdrawn after the recommended
bill had been passed, and the bill was vetoed by the Governor.
In 1941 the Commission finally made a comprehensive recommenda-
tion, proposing four bills which were enacted. In 1936 the Commission
had interpreted New York cases from 1830 on as denying effect to a
gratuitous promise under seal.29 Forced to re-examine that interpretation
and the policy it reflected by the 1937 decision of the Court of Appeals,
22 Laws 1937, c. 80, amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 342(2); see Leg. Doc. No. 65(H),
Report of Law Rev. Com. 83-128 (1937).
23 Laws 1937, c. 77, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 33-a, 33-b, N.Y. Real Prop. Law
§§ 280, 281; see Leg. Doc. No. 65(K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 201-248 (1937).
24 See note 9 supra.
25 Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 172, 7 N.E.2d 89 (1937) ; cf. United States Trust Co. v.
Frelinghuysen, 288 N.Y. 463, 43 N.E.2d 492, rehearing denied, 289 N.Y. 757, 46 N.E.2d
359 (1942).
26 See Thompson, note 19 supra, at 7.
27 Transbel Investment Co. v. Venetos, 279 N.Y. 207, 18 N.E.2d 129 (1938); cf. Brick
v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 283 N.Y. 99, 27 N.E.2d 518 (1940); Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), Report
of Law Rev. Com. 167-193 (1940).
28 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 345-414 (1941); Laws 1941,
c. 329, amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 342 (sealed instruments), adding N.Y. Real Prop.
Law § 282 and N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33-c (modification of written agreements), and
amending statutes on corporate seals and on statutes of limitations; Laws 1941, c. 328,
adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 279(4) and N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33(5) (irrevocable
offers); Laws 1941, c. 330, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 279(3) and N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law § 33(4) (written assignments); Laws 1941, c. 331, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law §
279(2) and N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33(3) (past consideration).
29 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(D5 at 218, Report of Law Rev. Com. 288 (1936).
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the Commission concluded that the seal should be abolished except as an
authenticating device for public officials and corporations, and that no
formality should be given effect as a universal substitute for consideration.
In specific cases, however, a signed writing was made enforceable without
regard to consideration: firm offers, written assignments, and promises
expressly based on past consideration. To replace one feature of the
sealed instrument, effect was given to provisions in written agreements
forbidding oral modification.
Thus the Commission successfully advocated a program of narrow,
specific provisions covering only part of the ground covered by the
proposals of the English Committee and the New York Legislature and
Court of Appeals. The Commission did not overlook the ground not
covered: its study reflects an examination of the more general proposals
and of the seven specific recommendations of the English Committee.30
The law of New York, as modified by the Commission's bills in 1936
and 1941, seems to make provision for six of the seven specific situations
in which the English Committee found the common law of consideration
unsatisfactory: (1) past consideration, (2) discharge of a debt by partial
payment, (3) compensation for performance of legal duty, (4) considera-
tion moving from a third person, (5) irrevocable offers, (6) offers to be
accepted by a performance. The seventh, the "promise made with know-
ledge that the promisee will act in reliance on it," seems to have been
deliberately left to judicial development, in the expectation that cases on
charitable subscriptions might be extended. 31
Subsequent activities of the Commission in this field have not led to
any major change of policy. In 1944 the Legislature enacted a Commis-
sion bill amending the various Commission statutes requiring signed
writings; the amendments make it clear that an agent's signature is
sufficient, except that where the transaction affects real property the
agent must be authorized in writing.32 In 1948 the Commission re-
examined the judicial decisions construing the statutes on releases and
modification agreements, and concluded that there was no need for
amendment;33 in 1950 a complaint from the Comptroller led to a restora-
tion of the 20-year statute of limitations for certain publicly-held bonds.34
30 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M) at 32 et seq., Report of Law Rev. Com. 376-414 (1941).
31 Id. at 44, Report of Law Rev. Com. at 388; cf. I. & I. Holding Corp. v. Gainsburg,
276 N.Y. 427, 12 NM..2d 532 (1938)
32 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 103-129 (1944); Laws 1944,
c. 588, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 243, 278-282, and N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 33-
33-c; cf. Matter of Hyde, 177 Misc. 666, 31 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
33 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(R), Report of Law Rev. Com. 643-646 (1948).
34 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 193-219 (1950); Laws 1950,
c. 783, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 47-b; cf. note 28, supra.
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The only real difficulty with the Commission's program came with the
decision in Green v. Doniger,35 which led to a Commission recommenda-
tion in 1951; that recommendation was vetoed, but a revised bill was
enacted in 1952.36
In Green v. Doniger a written contract of employment stipulated
against oral change, but provided for termination on 30 days written
notice by either party. The employee claimed that the contract had been
orally abandoned and a new oral agreement made which was identical
except for the addition of bonus payments. The Court of Appeals up-
held the claim on the ground that the termination clause in the contract
withdrew discharges, as distinguished from changes, from the operation
of section 33-c of the Personal Property Law. That section, like
section 282 of the Real Property Law, was part of the 1941 program of
the Commission; it denied effect to "an executory agreement . . . to
change or modify, or to discharge in whole or in part" a written agree-
ment "which contains a provision to the effect that it cannot be changed
orally," unless the executory agreement was in writing and signed.
The Commission apparently agreed with the dissenting judges that
to give effect to a change by calling it an abandonment "would be to
annul the statute and render its operation nugatory." A Commission
bill to overrule the decision was criticized on the ground that oral termi-
nation should not be precluded unless the contract expressly forbids oral
termination, and was vetoed in 1951. The Commission returned to the
fray in 1952, and obtained enactment of a far more elaborate bill. As a
result, the statute now makes separate provisions (1) against oral
"change," (2) against oral "termination," (3) partially defining (a)
"change" and (b) "termination" and (c) the effect of a contract which
both forbids oral termination and permits termination on notice without
specifying that the notice be in writing, (4) against oral "waiver" of
provisions for termination on written notice, (5) for signature by an
agent, and (6) setting three different effective dates. Even these elabo-
rate provisions cannot resolve all possible questions, of course; questions
remain, for example, as to the precise line between an ineffective "execu-
tory" agreement and a valid "executed accord and satisfaction other than
the substitution of one executory contract for another."
Mention should also be made of the Commission's 1952 study, resulting
in no legislative recommendation, on compensation for unsolicited dis-
35 300 N.Y. 238, 90 N.E.2d 56 (1949) (3 judges dissenting), noted 36 Cornell L.Q. 131
(1950).
36 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 659-678 (1951); Leg. Doc. No.
65(E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 135-145 (1952); Laws 1952, c. 831, amending N.Y. Real
Prop. Law § 282 and N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 33-c.
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closure of business ideas.37 Much of that study relates to problems of
property rights in ideas, mutual assent and acceptance by conduct, and
unjust enrichment. The alleged agreements to pay compensation are
commonly highly informal; insofar as the common law of consideration
interposes an obstacle to the enforcement of written agreements of this
sort, the Commission statute validating past consideration seems to per-
mit it to be overcome.
This is not the place to attempt a detailed analysis of the merits and
demerits of the Commission's program relating to consideration and the
seal. The program has been conservative; many proposals have been
made for more drastic reform. But the Commission has been very suc-
cessful in the Legislature: all but one of the ten bills recommended were
enacted, eight of them at the first session to which the recommendation
was made. Contrast the more radical 1937 recommendation of the Law
Revision Committee, which has not yet resulted in any English legisla-
tion on consideration. The policy of the Commission's program, so far
as it goes, seems to be in harmony with professional thought outside
New York. The proposed Uniform Commercial Code, in article 2-
Sales, contains a number of provisions adopting parts of that policy for
contracts for the sale of goods: section 2-203, Seals Inoperative; section
2-205, Firm Offers; section 2-209, Modification and Waiver.
III. THE STATUTE OF FRAuns
The Commission program on consideration and the seal, substituting
the signed writing for consideration in specific situations, bears some re-
semblance to the Statute of Frauds, which imposes a signed writing as a
condition of enforcement of certain classes of contracts otherwise valid.
Re-examination of the Statute of Frauds appeared on the Commission's
calendar of proposals for future consideration in 1936, but no recom-
mendation was made to the Legislature until 1944. In that year, on the
Commission's recommendation, the Legislature amended section 259
of the Real Property Law to provide that land contracts must be signed
by the "party to be charged" instead of by the "lessor or grantor";38
it also included section 243 of the Real Property Law, relating to grants
of fee or freehold, among the provisions amended to require that a signing
agent be authorized in writing.39
Other Commission proposals in this field have been less successful. In
1946 a Commission bill to repeal the Statute of Frauds affecting "a con-
37 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(R), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 555-573 (1952).
38 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(D), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 71-102 (1944); Laws 1944, c. 198.
39 See note 32 supra.
1955]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
tract to establish a trust" failed in the Legislature.4° In 1947 and 1952
the Governor vetoed Commission bills designed to revise, elaborate, and
tighten the New York version of Lord Tenterden's Act, which denies
effect to a new promise or acknowledgment taking a case out of the
statute of limitations unless in writing and signed.41 In 1949 the Com-
mission recommended two bills to extend the Statute of Frauds to
promises to compensate real estate brokers and business brokers. 42
The business-broker bill was enacted; the real-estate-broker bill, much
less strict in its provisions as to the form and contents of the required
writing, failed. Finally, in 1953 the Governor vetoed a bill to relax the
requirement of a signed writing in some cases of contracts not to be
performed within one year.43 Out of a total of ten Commission bills
proposing changes in the traditional statutes requiring a signed writing,
only three have been enacted.
The proposal vetoed in 1953 was presented as "a first proposal" in a
general re-examination of the Statute of Frauds, dealing with a portion
which was thought "sufficiently severable . . . to permit of separate
treatment."4 4 The Commission had before it a study listing some 41
different classes of contracts for which New York statutes required
writings, but the suggestions for change received by the Commission and
the concern of the Commission seem to have been directed primarily at
what may be called the traditional Statute of Frauds, stemming from the
English statute enacted in 1677. That statute had been a source of
trouble since its enactment: the Mercantile Law Commission unsuccess-
fully recommended repeal of its sale-of-goods section in 1885; 4 and the
Law Revision Committee recommended repeal of all but the provision
for land contracts in 1937, four members dissenting as to contracts of
guaranty.46 The latter recommendation was renewed by the Law Reform
Committee, except as to contracts of guaranty, in 1953; and in 1954 the
recommendation was retroactively enacted by Parliament.47
40 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(I), Report of Law Rev. Com. 267 (1946) ; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law
§ 31(8).
41 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 133-166 (1947); Leg. Doc. No.
65(H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 187-258 (1952) ; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 59.
42 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 609-651 (1949); Laws 1949,
c. 203, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 31(10).
43 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(0) (1953) ; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 31.
44 Id. at 5.
45 See note 4 supra.
46 See note 9 supra; cf. Williams, "Statute of Frauds, S. 4," 24 N.Z.L.J. 301 (1948);
"The Work of the New Zealand Law Revision Committee, 1948," 25 N.Z.L.J. 49, 50 (1949).
47 See Law Reform Committee, First Report, Cmd. No. 8809 (1953); Law Reform
(Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 and 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34; 68 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1954).
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Having acted as a Commission consultant in connection with the
Statute of Frauds, I am in no position to evaluate its work. The com-
parison with its work on consideration is curious: in both cases the
Commission proposed revision while the English Committee proposals
amounted to abolition. With respect to consideration, the less far-
reaching proposals prevailed in New York, while the drastic proposals
in England bore no fruit. As to the Statute of Frauds, the positions are
reversed: thus far, at least, little progress has been made in New York,
while repeal has been accomplished in England. Not all the reasons for
these differences are apparent, but a cautious approach to the Statute
of Frauds seems to be in harmony with American professional opinion.4
Two factors may be noted which distinguish the situation in England
from that in the United States. First, trial by jury in commercial cases
is almost unknown in England.49 Second, the rule that taxable costs
include the fees of solicitor and counsel, together with a prohibition of
contingent fees, reduces the incentive to litigate doubtful claims; and
under the legal aid system inaugurated in 1949 the prospective plaintiff
must show to a local committee reasonable grounds for asserting his
claim.50 Fear of groundless claims seems to be better founded and more
widespread in New York; and an argument recently made on behalf of
the Statute of Frauds provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code may
have relevance: "the spread of literacy, the rise of metropolitan living,
the drive toward internal records, and the Code's removal of those unwise
misinterpretations which so largely influenced the English decision, leave
reasonable room for some Statute of Frauds in the sales field." 51 It
seems likely that the Commission will return to other provisions of the
Statute of Frauds after it has completed its work on the Code, and that
its work will proceed in the spirit of the quoted passage.
IV. RIGHTS OF THmD PARTmS
Assignments. The Commission has conducted comprehensive studies
with respect to several features of the law governing the assignment of
choses in action, and its resulting recommendations have been enacted.
In 1944 it recommended that assignments of rent under existing leases
of real property be brought within the real property recording acts, and
48 See 2 Corbin, Contracts § 275 (1950); Llewellyn, "What Price Contract," 40
Yale L.J. 704, 748 (1931); cf. Stevens, "Ethics and the Statute of Frauds," 37 Cornell L.Q.
355, 381 (1952); 27 So. Calif. L. Rev. 471,475 (1954).
49 See Jackson, Machinery of Justice in England 64-65 (2d Ed. 1953).
50 Id. at 258-278.
51 See Uniform Commercial Code, Supp. No. 1, p. 98 (1955).
1955]].
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its proposal was adopted; 52 four years later the statute was amended to
make it clear that it applied to present leases to begin at a future date.13
In 1946 the Commission made an elaborate report on the assignment of
accounts receivable, recommending no legislation. 4 And in 1950 the
Commission obtained a thorough recodification of the law governing
assignment of wages, first proposed in 1948 but withdrawn for further
study.55 Less ambitious but equally successful projects were the valida-
tion of gratuitous written assignments, referred to above,56 and the over-
ruling of a series of cases on bondholders' claims.57 The result of the
latter project was a statute providing that, unless expressly reserved in
writing, claims related to bonds passed to transferees of the bonds.
The law of assignments is included in the Restatement of Contracts,
and each of the assignment statutes just mentioned has an impact on
contract law. But a little reflection reveals that transfer of intangible
property inevitably raises many problems outside what is ordinarily re-
ferred to as the law of contracts. The wage-assignment statute, for example,
is in part social legislation restricting creditors' rights; in part it is a
filing statute for a particular type of secured transaction. The accounts-
receivable study was touched off by developments in the federal bank-
ruptcy law; it deals broadly with the law of chattel security and inven-
tory financing. Professor Williston and the American Law Institute have
striven mightily to unify the law of contracts, combatting its tendency to
fall apart. The work of the Law Revision Commission on the law of
assignments suggests that at least in this area subdivision may be
inevitable.
Filing; Secured Transactions. Filing provisions relating to contracts
have been the subject of a number of Commission studies besides those
on assignments, but the Commission's proposals have had mixed success.
The Commission has secured the enactment of many statutes affecting
the real property recording system, but only the provisions for assign-
52 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(I), Report of Law Rev. Com. 221-289 (1944); Laws 1944, c.
262, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 294-a and 321-a and amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law
§§ 291, 294, 315, 316, and 329.
53 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(j), Report of Law Rev. Com. 359-379 (1948); Laws 1948,
c. 210, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law §294-a.
54 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 351 (1946).
55 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 123-233 (1948); Leg. Doc. No.
65(A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 25-47 (1950); Laws 1950, c. 823, inserting N.Y. Pers.
Prop. Law Art. 3-A.
56 See note 28 supra.
57 See Leg. Doe. No. 65(D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 67-94 (1950); Laws 1950, c. 812,
adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 41(4) ; Corbin, "The Subsequent Bondholder and the Delin-
quent Trustee," 51 Colum. L. Rev. 813 (1951).
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ments of rent and a provision giving effect to the recording of land con-
tracts seem to be germane to the present discussion. The latter was first
proposed in 1937 and was finally enacted the third time it was proposed,
in 1940.18 A 1942 report on conditional sales of fixtures included no
recommendation for legislation."
The chattel-mortgage and conditional-sale statutes have been before
the Commission many times. In 1936 and 1937 the Commission sought
unsuccessfully to harmonize the refiling provisions of the two statutes; '
in 1938 and 1939 it tried to conform the provisions as to the persons who
may take advantage of a failure to file, again without success.6 1 In 1941
it proposed to eliminate from the Uniform Conditional Sales Act modifica-
tions with respect to conditional sales for resale which had been made
when the Act was adopted in New York; the Legislature adopted that
proposal only in part, rejecting the part which would have subjected such
transactions to a filing requirement.2 More recently, the Commission
has secured the enactment of measures clarifying the place of filing and
the duration of refiling of chattel mortgages, and providing for the
destruction of old files of both conditional sales and chattel mortgages.
63
Creditors' Rights. A number of other Commission projects affecting
contracts show the same features which may be found in the fields of
assignments and chattel security: first, they deal specifically with partic-
ular types of contracts; second, they deal with contract rights as part of
the broader field of property rights or creditors' rights. One example is
the Commission study of anticipatory breach of contract, reported in
58 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 387-398 (1937); Leg. Doc. No.
65(D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 37-45 (1938); Leg. Doc. No. 65(E), Report of Law
Rev. Com. 157-166 (1940); Laws 1940, c. 745, amending N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 291, 294,
315, 316.
59 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 671-726 (1942); N.Y. Pers. Prop.
Law § 67.
60 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 781-794 (1936); Leg. Doc. No.
65(F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 61-66 (1937); compare N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 71 with
N.Y. Lien Law § 235.
61 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(J), Report of Law Rev. Com. 163-199 (1938); Leg. Doc. No.
65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 67-74 (1939); compare N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 65 with
N.Y. Lien Law § 230.
62 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(J), Report of Law Rev. Com. 237-275 (1941); Laws 1941, c.
851, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 69; cf. Tchlenoff v. Jacobs, 267 App. Div. 908, 46
N.Y.S.2d 875 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 904, 60 N.E.2d 32 (1944); First Nat. Bank of
Binghamton v. Arthur Hermann Co., 275 App. Div. 415, 90 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1949).
63 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 153-181 (1944); Laws 1944,
c. 169, amending N.Y. Lien Law § 232 (place of filing); Leg. Doc. No. 65(G), Report of
Law Rev. Com. 167-191 (1950); Laws 1950, c. 733, amending N.Y. Lien Law § 235
(duration of refiling); Leg. Doc. No. 65(B) (1953), Laws 1953, c. 355, amending N.Y. Pers.
Prop. Law §§ 70, 71, N.Y. Lien Law §§ 233, 235, and adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 383-b, N.Y. Public Officers Law § 65-b(5) (destruction of files).
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1940.4 That study dealt particularly with possible hardship resulting
from failure to apply the doctrine of anticipatory breach to leases of real
property; any such hardship was found to have been mitigated by
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, and no legislation was recommended.
A second example is the elaborate Commission bill enacted in 1952 to
provide for the levy of execution on debts and contract rights. 5
In 1950 the Commission made a comprehensive report on the history,
law, and current utility of general assignments for the benefit of creditors,
and its recommendations for a general revision of the New York statute
governing such assignments was enacted.66 The amendments were de-
signed to make the general assignment a more useful alternative to bank-
ruptcy as a device for the orderly administration of an insolvent estate.
To that end, some of the statutory requirements were relaxed and proce-
dure was modified to promote economy and efficiency; and the policy of
the Bankruptcy Act was adopted with respect to such matters as claims
for anticipatory breach of contracts and leases, definition of insolvency,
setting aside preferential transfers, and preferred claims for wages.
Beneficiaries and Sureties. Since 1917 New York law has required
that liability insurance policies contain a provision permitting the injured
person to bring a direct action against the insurer in certain circum-
stances. Thus in effect the tort creditor becomes a statutory beneficiary
of the insurance contract. In 1935, in connection with a study of the
survival of tort actions, the Commission had occasion to propose an
amendment to that insurance statute.67 The following year the Commis-
sion studied the statute again and obtained a further amendment,
permitting the tort creditor to sue the insurer when his tort judgment
remained unsatisfied for thirty days and eliminating the previous require-
ment that execution be returned unsatisfied because of the insolvency or
bankruptcy of the insured.68 And in 1945 the Commission obtained a
further amendment of the successor statute, extending the class of bene-
ficiaries to include contribution and indemnity creditors and assignees of
final judgments.69
64 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 385-404 (1940).
65 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(L), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 355-448 (1952); Laws 1952, c.
835, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 687-a and amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 643, 679,
and N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law § 151.
66 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(L), Report of Law Rev. Com. 285-360 (1950); Laws 1950,
c. 758, amending N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law Art. 2.
67 See Leg. Doc. No. 60(E), Report of Law Rev. Corn. 157-225 (1935); Laws 1935,
c. 795, § 5, amending N.Y. Insurance Law § 109, now N.Y. Insurance Law § 167.
68 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(P), Report of Law Rev. Com. 911-940 (1936); Laws 1936,
c. 433.
69 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 177-212 (1945); Laws 1945,
c. 409, amending N.Y. Insurance Law § 167.
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Suretyship proposals have not been highly successful. One of Judge
Cardozo's leading examples of outworn rules needing revision was the
discharge of a surety by a change in the obligation of the principal. 70
The Commission made a proposal limiting discharge to the extent of
prejudice in 1937 and again in 1938, without success."1 In the field of
construction contracts, the Commission in 1942 obtained a general re-
vision of the trust fund provisions of the mechanics' lien law, and in 1944
it amended that law to make clear its application to improvements under-
taken by public corporations.72 But when in 1945 the Commission sought
to clarify the rights of materialmen and laborers as beneficiaries under
the contractor's surety bond, only a small part of its proposal was
enacted; and a renewed proposal the following year also failed."'
Beneficiaries and Decedents. Contract rights often extend beyond the
life of the original parties, and attempts are often made to use contract
provisions to do the job traditionally performed by a will. In 1939 the
Commission recommended against statutory relaxation of the rule that
agency powers terminate on the death of the principal, partly because
agency powers continuing after death might conflict with the powers of
the decedent's personal representative. 4 The same year the Court of
Appeals had before it a mortgage extension agreement providing for the
payment of interest to named persons after the mortgagee's death; the
agreement was held invalid as an informal testamentary disposition.'
But rigorous enforcement of a rule against the use of contracts to
accomplish informal testamentary dispositions would force major changes
in such pervasive institutions as life insurance, savings deposits, and the
like. In 1943 the Commission acted with dispatch to prevent judicial
interference with United States Savings Bonds "payable on death" to a
named beneficiary.76 In 1945 the Commission recognized the similarity
70 See Cardozo, supra note 6, at 117.
71 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(Q), Report of Law Rev. Com. 871-952 (1937); Leg. Doc. No.
65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 31-36 (1938); cf. Katz v. Leblang, 243 App. Div. 421,
277 N.Y. Supp. 850 (1st Dep't 1935).
72 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(H), Report of Law Rev. Com. 271-336 (1942), Laws 1942,
c. 808, amending N.Y. Lien Law Art. 2 and adding N.Y. Lien Law Art. 3-A; Leg. Doc.
No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 489-525 (1944), Laws 1944, c. 363, amending N.Y.
Lien Law Arts. 1, 2, 3.
73 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(L), Report of Law Rev. Com. 433-472 (1945), Laws 1945, c.
380, amending N.Y. State Finance Law § 137; Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), Report of Law Rev.
Com. 79 (1946).
74 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(L), Report of Law Rev. Com. 685-737 (1939).
75 McCarthy v. Pieret, 281 N.Y. 407, 24 N.E.2d 102 (1939).
76 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 521-545 (1943); Laws 1943,
c. 632, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 24, overruling Deyo v. Adams, 178 Misc. 859, 36
N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1942).
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of insurance proceeds held for future distribution to the accumulation
of trust income, and extended to insurance accumulations the statute
permitting a destitute beneficiary to reach the funds.77
In 1947 it was suggested that beneficiary rights under various types
of transactions constituted a single subject, which should be unified by
statute s.7  Included in the list were trust deposits in savings banks,
insurance policies, annuity contracts, war savings bonds, social security
benefits, and pension, retirement or profit-sharing plans. Savings-bank
deposits in the name "A or B or survivor" are effective according to their
terms by statute even though testamentary; 79 after an unsuccessful at-
tempt to repeal that statute in 1950,° the Commission included them in
a comprehensive recommendation made in 1951.81 Two bills were pro-
posed: one would have validated testamentary designations of benefi-
ciaries for "institutional debts" and defined their effect; the second would
have permitted "institutional debtors" to pay small amounts to a wife,
close relative or creditor of a deceased "institutional creditor."
Both bills failed in 1951; revised and resubmitted in 1952, both were
enacted. 2 As enacted, the bill validating testamentary designations of
beneficiaries was limited to insurance agreements and pension, retirement
or profit-sharing plans; both trust and survivorship accounts in savings
banks and other institutions were excluded pending further study of the
rights of a surviving spouse in the light of an intervening decision of the
Court of Appeals. 3 The second bill permits payment without administra-
tion substantially as originally recommended, and gives effect to written
designations of beneficiaries to the limited extent of preventing such
payment. A Commission amendment in 1953 made it clear that payments
to creditors of the decedent could not be made if either the debt or the
aggregate payments exceeded $500.84
Bona Fide Purchasers. Among the Commission's first recommenda-
tions, made in 1935, were two relating to the rights of bona fide pur-
chasers.8 5 Those proposals brought the New York law into line with the
77 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(J), Report of Law Rev. Com. 351-392 (1945); Laws 1945,
c. 828, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17, overruling Nires v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc.,
290 N.Y. 78, 48 N.E.(2d) 268 (1943).
78 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M) at 24, Report of Law Rev. Com. 610 (1951).
79 Inda v. Inda, 288 N.Y. 315, 43 N.E.2d 59 (1942).
80 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(Q), Report of Law Rev. Com. 513-556 (1950).
81 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 587-657 (1951).
82 See Leg.' Doc. No. 65(G), Report of Law Rev. Com. 163-185 (1952); Laws 1952,
c. 820, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 24-a; Laws 1952, c. 824, amending N.Y. Dec. Est.
Law § 103-a and repealing seven other statutes.
83 Matter of Halpern, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.2d 120 (1951).
84 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(R) (1953) ; Laws 1953, c. 401.
85 See note 8 supra.
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law in other states by amending uniform laws, in both cases in accordance
with the recommendations of the National Conference of Commisioners
on Uniform State Laws. One bill adopted for the Uniform Sales Act and
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act a definition of "value" to include pre-
existing debts; the other amended the Uniform Sales Act to conform to
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act, making documents of title fully negotiable.
Other studies also related to bona fide purchasers under uniform laws.
In 1941 the Legislature adopted a Commission bill amending the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act to conform to the Federal Bills of Lading Act on
certain aspects of the liability of carriers for non-receipt or misdescrip-
tion. 6 The same year saw the partial enactment of the Commission
proposal with respect to conditional sales for resale, already referred to:17
the part enacted was designed to exclude mortgagees from the protection
given "purchasers" in ordinary course from the conditional buyer. And
the following year the Commission reported on "real" defenses, good
against a holder in due course under the Negotiable Instruments Law; it
found the law satisfactory and recommended no change.""
The rights of bona fide purchasers are of course affected by the statutes
governing the filing of assignments and secured transactions, discussed
above. And one sad note must be added: the Commission failed in two
attempts to eliminate from the law under the Factor's Act the capricious
concept of larceny by trick. 9
V. MISCELLANEOUS
Infants. The Commission's first proposal to curtail the power of an
infant to disaffirm his contracts was made in 1938; it would have elimi-
nated the power with respect to minors over eighteen in three situations:
(1) reasonable and provident contracts for education, (2) reasonable and
provident contracts in connection with a business in which the infant was
engaged, (3) contracts where the other party reasonably relied on a
written misrepresentation of age made by the infant.90 A much reduced
86 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 123-140 (1941); Laws 1941,
c. 316, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 209 (UBLA § 23).
87 See note 62 supra.
88 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 565-646 (1942).
89 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 19-39 (1940); Leg. Doc. No.
65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 49-54 (1941); L.W. Sweet and Co. v. Provident Loan
Soc., 279 N.Y. 540, 18 N.E.2d 847 (1939).
90 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(1), Report of Law Rev. Com. 95-161 (1938); Leg. Doc. No.
65(B), Report of Law Rev. Com. 59-66 (1939); Leg. Doc. No. 65(B), Report of Law
Rev. Com. 43-48 (1941); Laws 1941, c. 327, adding N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law § 260;
see Miller, "Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Age as Affecting the Infant's Contract," 15
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proposal was finally enacted in 1941, limited to the second situation only.
In 1948 the Commission made a very minor additional contribution in
this area." In 1946 a statute denied power to disaffirm to an infant
veteran or his infant spouse, in connection with loans under title three
of the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944; by relocating that provi-
sion the Commission made it clear that it applied to loans by insurance
companies and national banks as well as by state banks.
Land Contracts. Contracts relating to real property have of course
been affected by the Commission statutes on consideration and the seal,
by its amendments to the Statute of Frauds, and by its statutes dealing
with the recording system. To the statutes already referred to in these
connections should be added an act making enforceable without consid-
eration promises and warranties contained in formal conveyances, 92 and
an act extending the protection of grantees against claims that they orally
assumed pre-existing mortgage indebtedness. 3
The Commission has made comprehensive studies of two other aspects
of contracts for the sale of land. The first, relating to the risk of loss in
executory contracts, resulted in the adoption, with amendments, of the
Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act, together with a provision
saving the vendor's right to fire insurance protection.94 The second was
an attempt, twice unsuccessful, to mitigate the forfeiture imposed on a
defaulting purchaser under an installment contract.93
Negotiable Instruments. The Commission has made two studies of the
law of negotiable instruments; neither produced a recommendation for
legislation. One, relating to "real" defenses, has been mentioned." The
other, a 1952 study of notice of dishonor, produced a suggestion that
some of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law might be
anachronistic; but the Commission made no recommendation because of
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 73 (1953); Notes, 16 St. John's L. Rev. 154 (1941), 34 Va. L. Rev. 829
(1948).
91 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(Q), Report of Law Rev. Com. 631-641 (1948); Laws 1948,
c. 122, adding N.Y. Debtor and Creditor Law § 261 and repealing N.Y. Banking Law
§ 5(4).
92 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(K), Report of Law Rev. Com. 483-516 (1943); Leg. Doc. No.
65(C), Report of Law Rev. Com. 65-70 (1944); Laws 1944, c. 250, adding N.Y. Real
Prop. Law § 283.
93 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(P) (1953); Laws 1953, c. 684, amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act
§ 1083-c.
94 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 755-780 (1936); Laws 1936,
c. 731, adding N.Y. Real Prop. Law §240-a; Laws 1936, c. 252, adding N.Y. Insurance Law
§121-b; Notes, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1276 (1938), 5 U. Chi. L. Rev. 260 (1938), 36 Calif. L.
Rev. 476 (1948).
95 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 343-386 (1937); Leg. Doc. No.
65(E), Report of Law Rev. Com. 47-55 (1938); Note, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1938).
96 See note 88 supra.
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the enactment of the -statute in all the states and the desirability of
uniformity. 7
Sale of Goods. Two amendments to the Uniform Sales Act have been
described aboveY8 In 1943 and again in 1945 the Commission failed in
attempts to amend the provisions of the Act relating to warranty of fit-
ness for a particular purpose; the amendments would have extended the
benefit of the warranty to the buyer's employees and to members of his
household.9
The Commission had more success with two proposals to expand the
buyer's remedies. A bill enacted in 1948 eliminated the requirement that
a buyer elect between the remedies of damages and rescission when a
warranty is broken.'-0 And in 1952 the Commission finally obtained
enactment of a ten-year-old proposal to permit a defaulting buyer to
recover benefits conferred on the seller in excess of twenty per cent of
the price. °1 The original proposal was considerably broader, and would
have affected many other types of contracts as well.
Bailments. Amendments to the Uniform Bills of Lading Act have been
mentioned." 2 In 1949 a Commission statute invalidated contract pro-
visions exempting operators of garages and parking lots from liability for
negligence.103
Restitution; Election of Remedies. The Commission has obtained the
enactment of a number of statutes to liberalize the remedy of restitution
and the doctrine of election of remedies. Two such statutes have been
mentioned as amendments to the Uniform Sales Act.1 4 Restitution is a
standard remedy for breach of contract, and a complete treatment of the
Commission's work on the law of contracts would include such statutes.
Since the law of restitution is the subject of another article in this
Symposium, however, the statutes affecting the law of contracts are
merely listed in a note.105
97 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(S), Report of Law Rev. Com. 575-597 (1952).
98 See notes 8, 85 supra.
99 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(j), Report of Law Rev. Com. 409-482 (1943); Leg. Doc. No.
65(A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 19-25 (1945).
100 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 271-288 (1948); Laws 1948,
c. 276, amending N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 150(1) (d) (USLA § 69(1) (d) ); cf. N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 112-e, note 105, infra.
101 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 179-243 (1942); Leg. Doc. No.
65(A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 19-32 (1943); Leg. Doc. No. 65(C), Report of Law Rev.
Com. 83-101 (1952); Laws 1952, c. 823, adding N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 145-a.
102 See notes 8, 85, 86 supra.
103 Leg. Doc. No. 65(M), Report of Law Rev. Com. 801-815 (1949); Laws 1949, c.
332, adding N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 89-b.
104 See notes 100, 101 supra.
105 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(F), Report of Law Rev. Com. 205-299 (1939); Laws 1939,
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VI. UNrFoRM LAWS; THlE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
It is perfectly clear from the foregoing that the Commission has had
a large experience with uniform laws. And the Commission has shown
itself fully responsive to the goal of uniformity. Three of the uniform
laws have been enacted by all 48 states: the Negotiable Instruments Law,
the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, and the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act; none of those three has been the subject of an amendment proposed
by the Commission." 6 The Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Bills of
Lading Act, each enacted in thirty-odd states, have been amended several
times. Two of the USA and UBLA amendments followed recommenda-
tions of the National Conference; l07 one sacrificed interstate uniformity
to achieve conformity to federal law."08 Two of the USA proposals were
to insert provisions on points not expressly covered by the uniform act.10 9
Only in the case of election of remedies did the Commission tamper with
a uniform provision of the USA; and there the new proposal was justified
by conformity with another New York statute and with the new Uniform
Commercial Code."'
But neither the Commission nor the Legislature has been a slave to
uniformity. The policy of uniformity is at its weakest in the field of real
property, and the Commission proposed amendments to the Uniform Ven-
dor and Purchaser Risk Act with "the less hesitancy" because the act
had "not yet been enacted in any state.""' In seeking to restore sub-
stantive uniformity with respect to conditional sales for resale," 2 the
Commission felt free to introduce non-uniform language to make its
cs. 126, 127, 128, 147, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 112-a, 112-b, 112-c, 112-d (election
of remedies); Leg. Doc. No. 65(L), Report of Law Rev. Com. 283-344 (1941); Laws 1941,
c. 315, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-e (damages in addition to rescission for mis-
representation); Leg. Doc. No. 65(B), Report of Law Rev. Com. 27-67 (1942); Laws 1942,
c. 558, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-f (money paid under mistake of law); Leg. Doc.
No. 65(B), Report of Law Rev. Com. 31-78 (1946); Laws 1946, c. 683, adding N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 112-g (tender of benefits by rescinding party) ; Leg. Doc. No. 65(K), Report of
Law Rev. Com. 249-270 (1947); Laws 1947, c. 97, adding N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-h
(vendee's lien to secure restitution or damages); Leg. Doc. No. 65(K), Report of Law
Rev. Com. 339-354 (1952); Laws 1952, c. 487, amending N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 112-g
(adjustment of equities on rescission).
106 See notes 88, 97 supra. The Stock Transfer Act was amended in matters of form
only. Laws 1939, c. 76; see Leg. Doc. No. 65(N), Report of Law Rev. Com. 765-767
(1939).
107 See notes 8, 85, 98, 102 supra.
108 See note 86 supra.
109 See notes 99, 101 supra.
11o See Leg. Doc. No. 65(F) at 5, Report of Law Rev. Com. 275 (1948), note 100 supra,
at 5; cf. UCC §§ 2-608 and Comment 1, 2-711 (1952).
111 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(M) at 6, Report of Law Rev. Com. 780 (1936), note 94 supra,
at 6.
112 See notes 62, 87 supra.
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meaning clear. Again, in its attempts to harmonize the filing provisions
for conditional sales and chattel mortgages, the Commission at first
thought the Uniform Conditional Sales Act should prevail; later it re-
jected some of the UCSA policies."- 3 Its attitude is disclosed in the
following quotation:
The prepossession of the Commission is in general against recommend-
ing changes in a uniform statute. In this instance the Commission feels
differently, and for the following reasons: because the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act has been adopted in only a fraction of the states; because New
York made some change in the uniform statute at the time of enactment;
and especially because experience shows the superiority of New York's own
chattel mortgage legislation." 4
During the ten years since the Uniform Commercial Code was made
a joint project of the American Law Institute and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the reports of the Law
Revision Commission have repeatedly shown an awareness of the prog-
ress of the Code on the part of the Commission and its consultants." 5
References to the *Code are not confined to the studies of proposed
amendments to the uniform laws referred to above, for the Code touches
on many other matters which have been studied by the Commission. For
example, the Code sweeps up the whole field of chattel security and
assignments of contract rights. Again, the Code covers a good deal more
of the law relating to the formation and readjustment of sales contracts
than does the Uniform Sales Act; hence the overlap with the Commission
statutes on consideration and the seal.
On the face of it, then, the Commission is supremely qualified to exe-
cute the Governor's directive of February 1953 to undertake a thorough
legal analysis of the Code. It has had a good deal of experience with the
uniform laws, and has demonstrated a sympathetic understanding of the
movement for uniform commercial legislation. At the same time, its own
reports contain a vast wealth of information with respect to those matters
which the Code newly brings within the field of uniform legislation. As
to some of those matters, the Commission itself has been a pioneer, and
its efforts seem to follow lines of policy similar to those of the Code.
A word of caution may be added, however. The Commission has
itself made large proposals as well as small, though none nearly so com-
prehensive as the Code. But its work on uniform laws has related prima-
rily to specific details; the most comprehensive uniform laws originally
113 See notes 60, 61, 63 supra.
114 See Leg. Doc. No. 65(j) at 6, Report of Law Rev. Com. 168, note 61 supra, at 6
(1938).
115 See, e.g., note 110 supra; Leg. Doc. No. 65(D) at 22, Report of Law Rev. Corn. 88
(1950) (cf. UCC §§ 2-318, 3-417) ; Leg. Doc. No. 65(G) 22-174 (1950) (cf. UCC § 9-403) ;
Leg. Doc. No. 65(C) (1952), supra note 101, at 16 (cf. UCC § 2-718); Leg. Doc. No. 65(0)
at 17 (1953) (cf. UCC §§ 2-201, 8-319).
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enacted on its recommendation seem to be the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act 1" and the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act. 1
The former fills ten pages of the Commission's reports, and is set out and
annotated in 25 pages; the latter covers one page and is thoroughly
discussed in 18. In contrast the Code contains some 390 sections; as
introduced in the Massachusetts legislature the statutory text filled 253
pages; it is printed with Official Comments by the sponsors in 816 pages.
Annotations prepared in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania run to 201 and
170 pages, respectively. No single project in the Commission's history
adequately prepares it for a study of the Code.
Such a study, if it is to be useful, must steer a course between super-
ficiality on the one hand and supererogation on the other. The Massa-
chusetts and Pennsylvania annotations, prepared on short notice by
groups of volunteers, probably err on the superficial side; there seems
to be little danger that the Commission will follow their example. But
the Commission's tradition of exhaustive research and precise drafting
suggests the opposite danger that its study may bog down in endless
detail. The Code was twelve years in preparation, at a cost of more than
$350,000, before it was enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953, effective July
1, 1954."' Exhaustive annotation alone could occupy the full time of the
Commission for years; detailed rewriting may well be a project for the
ages.
Moreover, the Code reflects a long process of adjustment and compro-
mise of the conflicting views of innumerable judges, law teachers, and
practicing lawyers, including representatives of a wide variety of affected
industries. Discussion has been plenary; a bibliography of articles in
legal periodicals occupies 16 pages. 19 Most of the troublesome points
have long since been argued and reargued; revision has followed revision.
During the last two years the joint Editorial Board of the sponsoring
organizations has continued to receive and sift criticisms and suggestions,
and has recommended numerous changes."2 It is too late now to make
a fresh start in order to achieve greater linguistic artistry. Blunders can
be caught; particularly important policies can be re-examined; but in the
main the time has come to accept or reject the whole.
The Commission's published reports on two years of study of the
116 See Leg. Doc. No. 60(D), Report of Law Rev. Com. 91-156 (1935); Leg. Doc. No.
65(A), Report of Law Rev. Com. 27-58 (1936); Laws 1936, c. 892, adding N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. §§ 827-859.
117 See notes 94, 111 supra.
118 See Handbook of the Nat. Conf. of Cornmrs. on Uniform State Laws 126-150 (1954).
119 Wypyski, The Uniform Commercial Code-A Bibliography of Legal Articles and
Publications (American Law Institute 1954); cf. Leg. Doc. No. 65(A) (1954).
120 See Uniform Commercial Code, Supp. No. 1 (1955).
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Code, presumably reflecting the-expenditure of most of its $250,000 of
appropriations for that period, show an awareness of the problem of
bulk. 2' The Commission has adopted measures which may be used to
narrow the issues and bring them into focus: it divided the Code into
segments and retained a consultant for each segment, and it held a series
of public hearings. The 1955 report outlines in manageable compass a
series of pervasive problems. But that report merely raises questions; it
answers none.
There are disturbing hints of an erroneous assumption that time, paper,
and human energy are inexhaustible resources. For example, the energies
of the Commission seem to have been expended in part in the preparation
of "wholly tentative" redrafts of parts of the Code, apparently intended
"as discussional merely." It is to be hoped that this means that the
Commission is nearing the end of its annotation and research on those
parts of the Code, and that it has identified a series of important blunders
or policy issues. If not, the Commission may be in danger of being
overpowered by the sheer bulk of its own product. It is too early to
judge; at this stage it can only be said that the Commission is facing the
greatest challenge in its history.
VII. CONCLUSION
Others have often praised the work of the Commission, commonly in
connection with proposals that similar commissions be established else-
where. 22 I fully concur both in the praise and in the proposals. But a
twentieth anniversary should be an occasion for critical review as well
as a time to congratulate and commemorate. The New York Law Revi-
sion Commission is so well established that adverse comment on specific
points carries no implication of general hostility. Now is the time to
point out possibilities of improvement rather than merely to recommend
emulation.
Unfortunately, aside from the doubts expressed above in connection
with the Uniform Commercial Code, I have no adverse comment to make.
Inquiry reveals some dissatisfaction among students of contracts on
specific details of particular Commission statutes, but it would be sur-
prising if this were not so. The general criticisms I have heard are two:
(1) the Commission has confined itself to elegantia juris, to reviewing
specific judicial decisions on fine points of law; (2) the statutes are
121 See note 10 supra.
122 See Stone and Pette, "Revision of Private Law," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 221 (1940);
Heineman, "A Law Revision Commission for Illinois," 42 Ill. L. Rev. 697 (1948); Cross,
"Law Revision in the State of Washington," 27 Wash. L. Rev. 193 (1952); Sands, "Pro-
spectus for a Program of Legal Research Aimed at Substantive Law Revision in Alabama,"
4 Ala. L. Rev. 232 (1952).
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directions to judges in intricate detail, giving little guidance to the citi-
zens of New York on how to behave outside a courtroom.
The two complaints are obviously related, and both are false. This
survey has outlined the range and scope of the Commission's work; it has
dealt with large issues and small. The validation of contract clauses
which deny effect to oral modifications cannot compete for headlines with
an increase in tax rates, but the Commission was not established to deal
with highly-charged political issues. That particular statute has a perva-
sive effect, primarily because it is a guide to conduct in uncounted cases
never litigated. The importance of the Commission's work is attested by
the interest it has aroused among editors of law school casebooks and in
legal periodicals.
Some projects have been narrow, and have produced legislation rather
elaborately wrought. The 1952 amendment to the same statute on oral
modifications may serve as an example. 12 3 But even here criticism of the
Commission is misplaced; the criticism should instead be directed in part
at Jeremy Bentham and Judge Cardozo and in part at the legal commu-
nity in which the Commission operates. Bentham and Cardozo meant
their ministers of justice to deal with specific cases, though in somewhat
different ways. Bentham postulated a comprehensive code, which the
judges were to follow literally; if the code forbade blood-letting in the
streets, it was up to the minister to recommend a retroactive bill to excuse
the surgeon who broke the law in an emergency. Cardozo thought rather
of legislation, "not to imprison in particulars," but "to set the judges
free" to develop sound law.124
The Commission has tried to follow Cardozo's injunction. Its statutes
on consideration are negative, excising traditional doctrine without sub-
stituting new. And it has tried to "speak the language of general prin-
ciples." But it cannot remake entirely the society of which it is a part.
In a world where lawyers gain influence and power by the close reading
of corporate bond indentures or the monstrous grammar of the federal
tax laws, the art of plain talk is sometimes reserved for the short and
simple annals of the poor. And when judges read as Jeremy Bentham
said they should, it may become necessary to write with particularity
anything it is important for them to read. The Commission is not respon-
sible for the conflict between discretion and rule, which arose before there
was a State of New York or a Commission. Men will be trying to be
both simple and precise, and critics will complain of their failure, long
after both are gone. If the Commission has sometimes erred on the side
of complexity, the same may be said of the State of New York.
123 See text p. 702 following note 36 supra.
124 Cardozo, note 6 supra, at 117.
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